New strategic management study shows activist directorships yield increased reports of stakeholder harm
Strategic Management SocietyThe appointment of activist-nominated directors is an emerging phenomenon, but they’ve come with increased reports of stakeholder harm. A new study published in Strategic Management Journal found that activist directors bring immediate benefits to shareholders, but they appear to impose a managerial myopia that results in executives becoming less inclined to make long-term investments. The research team also found that the adverse effects on stakeholder harm are strongest when a director is a delegate — i.e., they work directly for an activist investor — compared with a trustee, who is appointed by, but does not work for, an activist investor.
The research team — Brian L. Connelly of Auburn University, Mark R. DesJardine of Dartmouth College, Wei Shi of University of Miami, and Zhihui Sun of Capital University of Economics and Business in Beijing — pulled data on thousands of companies that had directors appointed to their board by an activist investor between 2008 and 2019. They compared these boards to those without activist-nominated members to determine the likely consequences of the board appointments across a broad range of scenarios.
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