Extremism is a social problem, not just an individual pathology

When we think of extremist actors who use violence against innocent people, including children, we do ask ourselves how it is possible that some of us have such grossly diverging beliefs from the rest? 

How can it be that some of us (luckily, very few) believe that not all humans are morally equal and that some people’s lives count for less than others? How is it that some people believe that killing innocents can be a legitimate or even necessary means for a political cause that their victims – in all likelihood – have little or nothing to do with?

Sometimes, psychological explanations are sought: for instance, we may try to understand violent perpetrators’ views and actions through a mental health lens. But those only go so far. 

Firstly, there is no evidence to suggest that extremist violent actors suffer from mental health problems more than other people. 

Secondly, our explanations should go beyond the level of the individual, taking into account society at large. Extremism and political violence are arguably social problems, not merely individual pathologies.

Epistemology, the philosophical study of beliefs and how we come to hold them, can provide insight into the social dimensions of extremist views. We all hold any number of false and problematic beliefs, many of them inconsequential. Sometimes, however, they can prove to be fatal. Importantly, most of our beliefs, in particular those that concern social facts and those about morality, are not formed in isolation. We need to look at the informational environments within which people are located to understand how they may come to hold extreme beliefs.

Philosophers (and others) are increasingly drawing attention to so-called echo chambers. American epistemologist Thi Nguyen (2020) describes them as informational communities that are created by manipulating trust. Non-members of the community are being discredited as untrustworthy, unreliable, and malicious. 

Extreme beliefs within such echo chambers are “evidentially-insulated” – this means that they are immunized to counter-evidence through undermining the credibility and trustworthiness of those who may provide such counter-evidence. If outsiders and their views cannot be trusted, then they will not be able to change the views of insiders. Beliefs in echo chambers may concern politics, religion or (supposed) scientific facts. 

Echo chambers – once in place – are extremely difficult to break up (Nguyen 2020). And what is more, people who are caught in echo chambers may be genuinely unable to see past the set of beliefs that are propagated by their community.

Exposure to disagreement or alternative evidence, rather than getting the recipient to rethink their beliefs, can serve to reinforce those beliefs.

This is called “evidential preemption” (Begby 2021): when someone is provided with evidence for a certain belief and at the same time warned that they will subsequently be confronted with misleading evidence to the contrary.

If those who receive this information trust the original speaker then they will not change their beliefs based on the new evidence, but instead dismiss it and view the entire episode as proof that outsiders to their community are untrustworthy agents trying to manipulate them. This means that exposing people to more diverse information will not only be ineffective but potentially backfire.

Echo chambers are usually the result of deliberate epistemic manipulation. 

While I am not suggesting that all extremist agents are subject to such manipulation, it is plausible to assume that at least some are. Importantly, it is often beyond an individuals’ ability to recognize their epistemic environment as deeply flawed and manipulative. The responsibility to break up such spaces and provide “healthy” informational environments is best understood as a social responsibility, rather than being put onto individuals. 

While we ought to unequivocally condemn violence against innocents, we need to also acknowledge society’s responsibility for the informational environments which we jointly inhabit.

Murdoch University social philosopher Associate Professor Anne Schwenkenbecher writes about extremist beliefs, political violence and the ways in which deviant echo chambers operate.